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Pension and housing wealth fell substantially during the Great Recession in many industrial-
ized countries. This raised questions about the development of retirement savings adequacy.
Using a unique combination of survey and administrative panel data from before and after the
Great Recession in the Netherlands, we investigate co-movements between wealth and retire-
ment expenditure goals. We separate ‘pure’ wealth effects from common factors such as general
pessimism. The estimates show that a shock in annuitized pension wealth of 100 euros reduced
retirement expenditure goals with 23-33 euros. Whereas pensions drive the revision of goals for
older individuals, the results indicate that individuals between the ages of 25 and 49 are more
sensitive to housing wealth. Furthermore, while other studies find that the reaction of current
consumption to financial shocks is relatively strong for low-income households, we document that
long term expenditure goals are adjusted more by high-income households. Simulations show
that the fraction of individuals falling short with regard to their own retirement expenditure goal
would almost have doubled during the Great Recession if individuals would not have adjusted
their retirement expenditure goals downward.
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“Wealth consists not in having great possessions,
but in having few wants”
- Epictetus
1 Introduction
The recent Great Recession had a detrimental impact on household wealth in Western countries.
Disappointing stock market returns had a negative effect on wealth accumulated in funded pension
plans and austerity measures increased public pension eligibility ages. Moreover, during the crisis
residential property prices declined sharply. The rapid decline of wealth during the crisis raised a
host of questions for economic analysis, such as: what is the effect of a wealth shock on consumption,
on labor supply, and on retirement behavior? Since household portfolios in Western countries are
dominated by pension and housing wealth, concerns have also been expressed about the adequacy
of retirement resources.
The life cycle model of household spending, developed by Modigliani and Ando (1960) and
Ando and Modigliani (1963), predicts that individuals smooth exogenous wealth shocks over their
remaining lifetime. Furthermore, the original life cycle model predicts that the effects of wealth
shocks are the same for all asset types. Modern models, however, differentiate between asset classes,
since pension and housing wealth differ in many dimensions. For example, there may be transaction
costs related to borrowing against illiquid assets such as housing equity. Households may also
develop ‘mental accounts’ that dictate that certain assets are more appropriate to use for current
expenditure and others for long-term saving (Thaler, 1990).
There is a large body of literature on the effect of wealth shocks on consumption. Several studies
find evidence for a substantial causal effect of wealth on consumption,1 while others find only small
effects (e.g. Disney et al., 2010), or conclude that co-movements in consumption and wealth are not
generated by a causal relationship, but by common factors such as general optimism or pessimism
(Attanatio et al., 2009). Christelis et al. (2015) find that for every loss of 10% in housing and
financial wealth, current household expenditures drop by about 0.6% and 0.9%, respectively. Such
1Paiella (2009) provides an overview of the literature.
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order of magnitude was also found by Mian et al. (2013) and by Angrisani et al. (2015), and is in
line with the prediction of a life-cycle model (Poterba, 2000). Most studies examining the effect
of wealth on retirement behavior find little or no evidence that wealth shocks have a causal effect
on the (planned) timing of retirement (e.g. Coile and Levine, 2006; Hurd et al., 2009; Goda et al.,
2011; Goda et al., 2012 and Crawford, 2013).
This paper contributes to our understanding of wealth effects on household behavior. Instead of
investigating the effect of wealth shocks on current consumption or on the (planned) retirement age,
we examine the effect of wealth shocks on self-reported minimal retirement expenditure goals. Such
goals are important determinants of retirement savings adequacy, which we measure as the difference
between annuitized wealth at retirement and retirement expenditure goals on the individual level
(De Bresser and Knoef, 2015). Because of the aging society, understanding the relationship between
wealth and retirement expenditure goals becomes even more crucial, as the generosity of public
pensions declines and households become more dependent on financial markets and housing wealth.
This study estimates the ‘pure’ wealth effect that is the response of retirement expenditure goals
to unanticipated wealth shocks. This ‘pure’ effect is the causal effect that is of interest in most of
the literature (Paiella and Pistaferri, 2017) and that can, in the context of retirement expenditure
goals, mitigate the negative effect of a crisis on retirement savings adequacy. We separate this
‘pure’ effect from the effects of common macro factors that may be correlated with negative wealth
shocks, such as general pessimism and negative expectations about future labor market conditions.
The last part of the paper shows the degree to which co-movements between wealth and retirement
expenditure goals were able to compensate a decline in retirement savings adequacy brought about
by the Great Recession.
We estimate the effects of shocks to both pension wealth and housing wealth by regressing
first differences in retirement expenditure goals on differences in annuitized wealth from before and
after the Great Recession. In the Netherlands shocks to pensions are exogenous, since workers
cannot choose which pension fund to contribute to, how much to contribute, or which investment
strategy to follow. All aspects of participation in industry-wide funds are outside the control of
participants – occupational pensions are a fixed aspect of work in a given industry. The variation in
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shocks to pension annuities is driven by past investment decisions of pension funds. Moreover, the
pension cuts came unexpected, as almost all funds appeared financially fit before the crisis. While
the institutional framework renders changes to pension annuities exogenous, home owners could
react to the decline in house prices by increasing their mortgage down payments. Therefore, we
instrument shocks to net housing wealth, which may be influenced by endogenous mortgage down
payments, with shocks in gross housing wealth. Finally, simulations based on a seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) model are used to evaluate retirement savings adequacy with and without co-
variation between expenditure goals and resources.
We bring the model to the data using matched administrative and survey data. The survey
data contain self-reported retirement expenditure goals for a representative sample of the Dutch
population, collected in January 2008 at the eve of the downturn in the financial markets and in
December 2014, after some years of recession. A unique feature of these data is that individual
panel members can be linked to tax records and administrative data from pension funds and banks.
This allows us to construct a complete and precise measure of the financial resources available to
households.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. First, as far as we know we are
the first to investigate the effect of unanticipated wealth shocks on retirement expenditure goals.
Although effects of wealth shocks on (short term) consumption are often studied, analyses about
the long term are scarce. However, the long term relation is highly important for the develop-
ment of retirement savings adequacy. The analysis relies on administrative individual-level data
on unanticipated wealth shocks, instead of aggregate measures of house and stock price changes
that are often used in the literature. Second, this paper studies to what extent co-movements in
wealth and retirement expenditure goals during the Great Recession affected the development of
retirement savings adequacy. Retirement savings adequacy is defined by the difference between
individual retirement expenditure goals and annuitized wealth. It is common to measure readiness
against a single universal threshold, e.g. a poverty line or a replacement rate of 70% of prior income
or expenditures, or using a life-cycle model.2 However, universal thresholds fail to capture relevant
2For examples of universal standards of sufficiency see Haveman et al. (2007), Mitchell and Moore (1998) and
Skinner (2007). Engen et al. (2005) and Scholz et al. (2006) use life-cycle models to assess preparedness.
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differences in coping strategies, which may have changed after some years of recession. Benchmarks
based on the life cycle model are able to take into account differences between households, but have
difficulty to accurately reflect heterogeneous preferences without excessive computational burden.
This makes an alternative and complementary analysis useful.3
The estimation results show that a decrease of 100 euros per month in pension annuities reduced
retirement expenditure goals by 23-33 euros. Splitting the sample by age, the estimation results
suggest that expenditure goals of older individuals were primarily affected by pensions, while for
younger individuals real estate played a more important role. Older individuals may be more likely
to see their house as a bequest. For them, a higher house price may simply be a compensation for
a higher implicit rental cost of living in the house, but has no real wealth effect (Sinai and Souleles,
2005, and Campbell and Cocco, 2007). Pensions, on the other hand, may not be salient to young
individuals who have yet to accumulate a large part of their pension wealth. Another split, based
on the median household income in 2008, reveals that individuals in high-income households adjust
their expenditure goals more after a shock to pension wealth than do those with lower incomes.
This suggests that while literature on the marginal propensity to consume shows that current
consumption of low income individuals is more sensitive to shocks than current consumption of high
income individuals, we find that in the long run low income individuals may prefer to use different
margins to adapt to changing circumstances. They may, for instance, choose to work longer rather
than cut their desired spending (which is in line with the results of Lindeboom and Montizaan (2018),
on planned retirement dates). Comparisons between log-log and level-level estimates suggest that
only large drops in annuities resulted in a ‘pure’ wealth effect. As noted by Browning and Collado
(2001), consumers may be less likely to smooth consumption when changes are small and the cost
of adjusting consumption is not trivial.
Simulation results indicate that co-movements between wealth and retirement expenditure goals
tempered the adverse effect of the Great Recession on retirement savings adequacy considerably.
The fraction of individuals who are expected not to be able to afford their minimum retirement
expenditure goal increased from 27% to 32%, if we only take pension wealth into account. In case
3Our focus on attaining retirement expenditure goals after retirement means that we do not take into account other
reasons to save, such as precautionary or bequest motives. If such additional rationales exist, our analysis should be
interpreted as an upper bound on preparedness.
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individuals would not have revised their goals, around 50% would not have been able to finance
their retirement expenditure goals, based on pensions alone.4
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. Section 2 explains the Dutch pension system
and the ways it changed between January 2008 and December 2014. In section 3 we present the
data used for the analysis, followed by a description of our empirical strategy in section 4. Section 5
contains the results and section 6 concludes.
2 Pension reforms and the crisis
The Dutch pension system consists of four pillars: (1) public pension, (2) mandatory occupational
pensions, (3) voluntary private pension products such as life annuities, and (4) all other (voluntary)
assets such as private savings and housing wealth. In this section we describe these pillars and their
developments between January 2008 and December 2014 (the months in which the survey data
were collected). In the calculations of projected pension annuities we take these developments into
account.
2.1 Public pension
The first pillar consists of a flat rate public old age pension, financed through a pay-as-you-go
system. For every year that individuals live in the Netherlands, they build up rights to 2% of the
full public pension. Individuals who lived in the Netherlands during all 50 years before the statutory
retirement age receive a full public pension (50% of the minimum wage for individuals living in a
couple and 70% of the minimum wage for singles). For retirees with less than full public pension
rights as a consequence of living abroad, and insufficient other resources, the first pillar is topped
up with social assistance to guarantee a social minimum.
In 2008 the public pension eligibility age was 65. In 2012 an amendment passed that stipulated
a stepwise increase of the public pension eligibility age to 67 in 2023, after which it would be linked
4Note that, even though an appropriate decrease in retirement expenditure goals does result in better pension
savings adequacy relative to those goals, it still implies that the individual endures a welfare loss. This means that
there is less need to worry about individuals adapting their plans appropriately to their new situation. It however
does not imply that retirement incomes can decrease without any costs to the individual.
6
to life expectancy. In 2014 legislation was proposed to speed up the increase such that the public
pension eligibility age will reach 67 in 2021. If individuals work longer, they will also build up
more pension wealth as a consequence of this act.5 Since there was a lot of media attention for the
increase in the statutory retirement age, in our calculations we take the accelerated increase of the
retirement age into account (which became an Act of Parliament in 2015).
2.2 Occupational pensions
The Dutch save massively for their retirement via occupational pensions. 90% of all employees in
the Netherlands have a mandatory pension scheme with their employer (Bovenberg and Meijdam,
2001) and for many households pension savings are by far their largest financial assets. About
1344 billion euro is accumulated in Dutch pension funds (end 2017), i.e. on average nearly 175,000
euros per household. Employees cannot choose to which pension fund they want to contribute, but
are mostly assigned to a sector-specific fund. Changing pension funds would thus often require to
change to a job in a different industry.
Most occupational pension schemes are defined-benefit plans and for many years people did
not worry about their pension. Pension funds had large reserves and participants were not aware
of the fact that indexation was conditional on the financial situation of their fund. This changed
dramatically in 2008. Whereas in 2007 the average funding ratio was 144% and only 7 pension funds
had a reserve deficit, by the end of 2008 300 pension funds had a reserve deficit and the average
funding ratio6 was 96% (source: Dutch Central Bank). Most pension entitlements were no longer
indexed for inflation and some entitlements were even cut in nominal terms. For example, large
funds for metal electro, metal technologies, and tooth technologies had to cut nominal pensions in
2013 with 5.2%, 6.3% and 7.0%, respectively. The biggest pension fund in the Netherlands (ABP),
covering about 2.8 million individuals, has not been able to index pension entitlements and pension
5Mastrobuoni (2009) and Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) indicate that an in increase in the statutory retirement
age is likely to result in an increase in the actual retirement age.
6The funding ratio is the main measure of financial health of pension funds. The legally required funding ratio
in accordance with the European pension fund guidelines is 104.2% (IORP Directive, PbEG 2003/41/EG). Pension
funds need to hand over a recovery plan to the Dutch Central Bank if their funding ratio is below 104.2% and need to
cut pensions when their funding ratio is below 104.2% in five consecutive years. A fund is allowed to index pensions
for price inflation when their funding ratio exceeds 130%. Between 110% and 130% partial indexation is possible
(DNB, 2016).
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benefits since 2010 and on top of that had to cut pensions by 0.5% in 2013. In total the forgone
indexation between 2008 and 2014 amounts to 9.93% (source: website ABP).
There are vast differences in funding ratio trends between funds: figure A1 in Appendix A shows
that the relative decline in funding ratio during 2008 is spread between 0 and -60%. Such variation
is explained by (a) the pursued interest rate hedging policy, (b) the asset mix of the investment port-
folio, (c) contributions to the fund, and (d) sensitivity to increased life expectancy (which is higher
for funds with a relatively large proportion of young participants) (DNB, 2014). Because of these
different trends, households are confronted with different shocks to pension wealth. These shocks
were unanticipated and are exogenous. Exogeneity is embedded in the system, because individual
participants in Dutch pension funds have no influence on their contribution and investment strat-
egy. Moreover, it is difficult to change funds, since funds often cover entire industries (for instance,
there is one single fund for all government employees and another one for all of dentistry). However,
they were aware of the developments, since the 2008 Pension Act obliged all pension providers to
provide a standardized yearly overview of current and projected entitlements (the Uniform Pension
Overview, UPO). The fact that shocks to pension wealth were exogenous and salient makes them
interesting to investigate.
Pension reforms took place in the aftermath of the financial crisis. In 2014 annual tax-favored
pension accruals have been reduced from 2.25% to 2.15%, and it was decided to reduce them further
to 1.875% in 2015. This means that the percentage by which pensions are built up each year is
reduced. Moreover, as of 2014 the age that forms the basis for the accrued pension rights increased
from 65 to 67. This means that occupational pensions will be less generous for future retirees.
2.3 Voluntary private savings
The third pillar plays a relatively minor role in the Netherlands. It is formed by voluntary individ-
ual pension products, such as life annuities. The self-employed and individuals with a gap in their
pension entitlements are allowed to buy life annuities on fiscally attractive terms. Voluntary retire-
ment savings in savings accounts, stocks and/or bonds are not very common in the Netherlands
because of the fiscally attractive and high accumulation of wealth in occupational pension plans.
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For example, in 2014 the median household in the fifth decile owned only 8,300 euros of financial
wealth (source: Statistics Netherlands). Such small amounts are probably precautionary savings
rather than aimed for retirement. Finally, households may accumulate housing wealth (the fourth
pillar). After a long period of steady increases, house prices have taken a hit between 2008 and
2014, decreasing by 20% on average.
3 Data
In this study we match survey and administrative data at the individual level. Section 3.1 describes
the survey data on retirement expenditure goals, and section 3.2 the administrative data on assets.
3.1 Survey data
Survey data are taken from the Longitudinal Internet Study in the Social Sciences (LISS panel),
gathered by CentERdata.7 This panel is recruited through address-based sampling (no self-selection),
and households without a computer and/or internet connection receive an internet connection and
computer for free. This roughly nationally representative household panel (Van der Laan, 2009)
receives online questionnaires on different topics each month. When respondents complete a ques-
tionnaire they receive a monthly incentive. A variety of data is available from studies conducted in
the LISS panel.
We use a question regarding retirement expenditure goals elicited from LISS-respondents both
in a single-wave study in January 2008, constructed by Johannes Binswanger and Daniel Schunk
(Binswanger et al., 2013), and in a single-wave study in December 2014, constructed by the authors.8
In both studies the question is placed at the beginning of the survey, after a couple of items regarding
housing costs during retirement. The question is phrased as follows:
This question refers to the overall level of spending that applies to you [and your part-
ner/spouse] during retirement. What is the minimal level of monthly spending that you
7For more information we refer to http://www.lissdata.nl/lissdata/.
8The recession in the Netherlands, defined as a period of two quarters of negative GDP growth, started in the
second quarter of 2008. The last period of recession was between the third quarter of 2012 and the second quarter of
2013. Appendix B shows the development of consumer confidence between the two surveys.
9
want during retirement? Please think of all your expenditures, such as food, clothing,
housing, insurance etc. Remember, please assume that prices of the things you spend
your money on remain the same in the future as today (i.e., no inflation).
We find that people provide reasonable answers to this question. As shown by De Bresser and
Knoef (2015) and below, people provide decent answers compared to their current income level.
Furthermore, non-retirees provide a similar distribution of answers as retirees (who know what it is
to be retired).9 Finally, we asked people whether they found it difficult to answer this question.10
In our models we control for the fact that answers given by respondents who indicate they find
it difficult to answer could be systematically higher or lower than others. De Bresser and Knoef
(2015) found no evidence of systematically different answers from individuals who found it difficult
or easy to answer the question.
It is important to understand how respondents interpreted the question. Therefore, in December
2014 at the end of the questionnaire (after other questions about health expectations, health care,
and pension expectations) we asked respondents how satisfied they would be with a retirement
income of X euro, where X is their self-reported minimal retirement expenditure goal from the
beginning of the questionnaire. Most people report a satisfaction level 3 or a 4 on a scale from 1 to
7. In that same survey we also asked respondents about their preferred retirement expenditure goal
(taking into account that there is a trade of between current and future expenditures). When asked
to rate their preferred retirement income level on a scale from 1 to 7, most people report a 4 or a 5.
Both minimal and preferred retirement expenditure goals increase with income, and the difference
between them has the same order of magnitude across income groups (the relative difference even
declines a bit from 14% of current income for the lowest income quintile to 9% of current income
for the highest income quintile). All of this suggests that respondents did not interpret the question
as subsistence consumption, but rather as the amount of expenditure they would need to reach a
neutral satisfaction level.
In 2008 it was safe to assume individuals did not take into account health care expenditures
when reporting expenditure goals, since long term care costs were almost fully covered by the
9These descriptives can be found in Appendix C.
10Appendix C provides more details about how respondents rated the difficulty of the question.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics retirement expenditure goals
a. Retirement expenditure goals
2008 2014
N Mean SD p25 Mdn p75 N Mean SD p25 Mdn p75
Monthly expendituresa 1396 1744 733 1218 1625 2031 2755 1495 570 1095 1460 1825
Replacement rateb(%) 1396 76 28 57 75 91 2717 67 29 47 63 80
b. Changes in Retirement expenditure goals
N Mean SD p25 Mdn p75
Monthly expenditures 456 -267 640 -571 -227 79
Replacement rate (%-points) 452 -11 30 -28 -11 5
a Retirement expenditure goals are standardized to a one-person household and expressed in 2014 euros.
b Replacement rate is defined as the retirement expenditure goal divided by current income.
government and mandatory insurance at that time. By 2014 this was no longer the case, so we
asked respondents whether they took health care costs into account in their answer. If so, they were
subsequently asked what their minimal expenditures would be without these costs. We analyze
minimal expenditures net of health care costs to safeguard comparability.
The survey was administered to household heads and their spouses as from the age of 25, with a
reported net monthly household income higher than 800 euros (in this way students are excluded).
In 2008 the survey was administered to a random half of the eligible panel members, in 2014 the
full eligible sample was included. Descriptive statistics of socio-economic variables can be found in
Appendix D.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of self-reported retirement expenditure goals in 2008 and
2014 (both expressed in 2014 euros using the consumer price index). The median retirement ex-
penditure goal dropped by 165 euros (10%), from 1625 euros/month in 2008 to 1460 euros/month
in 2014. Both ends of the inter-quartile range (1218 and 2031 euros/month in 2008) also decreased
by approximately 10%, indicating that retirement expenditure goals decreased across the distribu-
tion. Expenditure goals declined not only in absolute terms, but also relative to current income:
replacement rates dropped from a median of 75% in 2008 to 63% in 2014. This can also be seen
in figure 1, which shows how retirement expenditure goals are related to current income. Reported
goals increase with income in both years, but this relationship was flatter in 2014 compared to 2008.
The bottom panel of table 1 describes the differences between 2008 and 2014 for those individuals
whom we observe twice. Due to panel attrition the number of individuals who are in the sample in
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Figure 1: Kernel regressions of retirement expenditure goals on household income
(shaded areas are 95% confidence bands).
both years is relatively low: we retain around 450 individuals or one third of the 2008 sample. Among
those who do remain in the sample, most revised their retirement expenditure goal downwards with
a median revision of -227 euros/month. The median revision in the replacement rates is -11%-
points. However, there is a lot of variation: a quarter of the individuals reduced their minimum
consumption level by at least 571 euros/month, while another quarter of individuals increased their
retirement expenditure goal by 79 euros or more. Retirement expenditure goals are fairly strongly
correlated across the years: the correlation coefficient is 0.55 for levels and 0.29 for replacement
rates.
3.2 Administrative data
Administrative data are taken from the Complete Asset Data of the Netherlands 2008 and 2013
(CAD), the Public Pension Entitlements data 2008 and 2012 (PPE), the Public Pension Benefits
data 2008 and 2012 (PUBLB), the Occupational Pension Entitlements data 2008 and 2012 (OPE),
and the Private Pension Benefits data 2008 and 2013 (PRIVB), all gathered by Statistics Nether-
lands.
The CAD consists of all households in the Netherlands and contains data on savings accounts,
stocks, securities, property, business wealth, and debt. Debt is categorized in mortgage and other
debt. Although most of these data are derived from tax records, banks also provide information
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about bank accounts. Banks have to report accounts with a balance of 500 euro or more (or 15
euro in interest payments), which means that we only miss small amounts of money held in bank
accounts.
PPE and OPE contain data on public and occupational pension entitlements for the entire
Dutch population between the ages of 21 and 64. PUBLB and PRIVB contain data on public
and private pension benefits received by all retirees (based on tax records). Third pillar pensions
(e.g. life annuities) are, unfortunately, only observed in administrative data once they are claimed,
because they are subject to taxation only in the payout phase. Therefore, the LISS Assets Survey is
used to supplement the administrative data of pre-retirees with survey data on third pillar pension
entitlements. We use the administrative records from 2008 to match the survey answers provided
in 2008. To match the survey answers provided in 2014 we use the most recent administrative data
available and adjust for aggregate changes between the time of measurement and 2014.
Panel a. of table 2 summarizes the monthly annuities from pensions and wealth (more details
about the wealth data can be found in Appendix E). We use three definitions of after-tax pension
annuities: (1) annuities based on public and private pensions, (2) annuities based on pensions plus
private wealth other than real estate, and (3) annuities based on all wealth (including real estate).
The assumptions used to annuitize wealth can be found in Appendix F.11 The median projected
annuity based on public and occupational pensions declined by around 400 euros, or 20%, from
2146 to 1723 euros/month between 2008 and 2014.12 We observe similar declines of 15-20% (300-
400 euros) for the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution, respectively. The smaller absolute
decline for the 25th percentile compared to the median and the 75th percentile can be explained by
the fact that the flat rate public pension makes up a large share of entitlements for pension-poor
households. This public pension tracks the minimum wage and has been adjusted for inflation
during the period spanned by our sample (and, according to our assumptions, will be indexed for
inflation in the future). Pension-rich households, on the other hand, rely more on occupational
11The 2008 figures differ slightly from the numbers in De Bresser and Knoef (2015). In that paper the 2008 figures
were adjusted to reflect the situation at that time (2014) as closely as possible. In this paper however, we aim to
produce figures as close to the 2008 situation as possible.
12The descriptives in table 2 refer to the baseline scenario regarding future indexation of pensions, descriptives for
other scenarios that are used for robustness checks are available on request.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of assets, debt and annuities
a. Annuities
2008 2014
N Mean SD p25 Mdn p75 N Mean SD p25 Mdn p75
Pensions 900 2170 729 1673 2146 2537 3646 1789 768 1352 1723 2135
Percentage of total 890 72 18 61 71 83 3426 73 33 61 74 93
Pensions + wealth 890 2401 959 1811 2271 2767 3429 2103 1447 1479 1890 2409
Percentage of total 890 78 16 68 76 92 3429 81 20 70 80 100
Pensions + wealth + housing 890 3275 1650 2306 3104 3900 3429 2781 1947 1734 2469 3277
b. Changes in annuities between 2008 and 2014
Absolute changes (2014 euros) Percentage changes (%)
N Mean SD p25 Mdn p75 N Mean SD p25 Mdn p75
Pensions 630 -355 502 -515 -284 -84 630 -13 19 -22 -12 -5
Pensions + wealth 597 -298 809 -514 -256 -37 597 -10 26 -20 -11 -2
Pensions + wealth + housing 597 -507 1441 -806 -449 -114 597 -13 26 -24 -15 -4
Monthly standardized annuities in 2014 euros.
pensions, many of which have not been indexed fully for inflation or have even been cut in nominal
terms.
Taking non-housing wealth into account does not change the pattern, which suggests that ac-
cumulation of discretionary wealth did not compensate much of the decline in pensions across the
annuity distribution. The last definition, based on all wealth components, shows the remarkable
decline in the value of real estate. The median monthly annuity according to this definition de-
clined by 635 euros (20%), from 3104 to 2469 euros/month. In relative terms the decline is more
pronounced for the 25th percentile (572 euros or 25%) than for the 75th percentile (623 euros or
16%).
The bottom panel of table 2 describes the distribution of changes in annuities between 2008
and 2014 for those households that we observe twice and can be matched to administrative data
in both waves. A similar picture emerges: the crisis and subsequent pension reforms substantially
reduced the financial resources available during retirement. The median attainable pension (public
plus private), dropped by around 20% due to reductions in real occupational pension entitlements.




Our empirical strategy follows two steps. First, we use the subsample of individuals whom we
observe before and after the Great Recession to investigate the size and nature of co-movements
between pension wealth, housing wealth and retirement expenditure goals (described in section 4.1).
Second, we simulate to what extent co-movements between wealth and retirement expenditure
goals mitigated adverse effects of the Great Recession on retirement savings adequacy (described in
section 4.2).
4.1 Size and nature of co-movements between wealth and retirement expendi-
ture goals
In the first step, we investigate the relationship between wealth shocks and retirement expenditure
goals. We regress changes in retirement expenditure goals on changes in wealth, controlling for
common factors and demographic variables. More precisely, we estimate
∆Ri = β0 + β1∆PAi + β2∆HAi + ∆xiβ3 + εi (1)
∆HAi = γ0 + γ1∆HPi + γ2∆PAi + ∆xiγ3 + νi (2)
Where (1) follows from a standard consumption Euler equation (as noted by Souleles, 1999).13 In
(1) ∆Ri is the change in retirement expenditure goals between 2008 and 2014 for individual i, PAi
is the pension annuity, HAi is the annuity from net housing wealth,
14 and εi an error term.
In addition to estimation of equation (1) by OLS, we use 2SLS to disentangle exogenous variation
in housing wealth from individual decisions (e.g. extra mortgage down payments). Similar to
Angrisani et al. (2015) we instrument shocks in net housing wealth with shocks in house prices
(HPi in equation (2)). However, Angrisani et al. (2015) and most of the literature use regional
variation in the development of house prices to identify the causal link between shocks in housing
wealth and current spending, because reliable data on housing wealth at the household level are
13As mentioned by Christelis et al. (2015), this framework has also been used by others, such as Parker (1999),
Johnson et al. (2006), Agarwal et al. (2007), and Disney et al. (2010).
14Defined as the difference between the total annuity and the annuity from pensions and non-housing wealth.
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rare. Our administrative data do allow us to exploit shocks in house prices at the household level.
In this way we can also exploit the idiosyncratic component of house price risk specific to each
dwelling (e.g. variation across neighborhoods and types of buildings) to identify the causal effect of
housing wealth shocks on changes in retirement expenditure goals (β2).
Causal effects of changes in wealth are called ‘pure’ or direct wealth effects. Another possibility
is that there are common macro-economic factors that affect both consumption and wealth. For
example, future income prospects or general optimism or pessimism may influence both asset prices,
house prices, and retirement expenditure goals. Distinguishing ‘pure’ wealth effects from common
factors is important as they have a different impact on the development of retirement savings
adequacy after a wealth shock. Pure wealth effects diminish the negative effect of a recession on
retirement savings adequacy (measured by the difference between expenditure goals and resources).
Common factors can also contribute to mitigate this negative effect on retirement savings adequacy,
but to a lesser extent. By definition common factors affect all individuals regardless of the size of
their change in wealth. Unlike ‘pure’ wealth effects, such aggregate adjustments of goals are not
concentrated among those individuals who experience large shocks.
To identify the ‘pure’ effect of pension wealth, we exploit variation across households in pension
wealth shocks (∆PA) brought about by the Great Recession. As explained in section 2.2, pension
contributions are mandatory in the Netherlands. Participants cannot choose their own pension fund,
set their level of contributions, or influence the investment strategy. This implies that changes to
pension wealth are plausibly exogenous and we can interpret β1 as the ‘pure’ effect of pension
wealth.
It could be argued that common macroeconomic factors, such as optimism, pessimism, and
risk aversion, affect both asset prices (Campbell, 1991) and retirement expenditure goals. In this
way, macroeconomic factors could be a third factor influencing both pension wealth shocks and
retirement expenditure goals. However, this would not impede us from identifying a ‘pure’ effect of
pension wealth shocks, because the identification relies on variation between pension funds. This
variation is caused by differences in the pursued interest rate hedging policy of the fund, the asset
mix of the investment portfolio, contributions, and the average age of the participants in a fund.
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These factors cannot be influenced by individual households. Common macroeconomic factors such
as general pessimism are captured by β0.
Finally, one could argue that during the crisis households may have observed reduced rates
of return on retirement saving. This could lead to lower voluntary retirement saving, through a
substitution effect, and hence cause lower retirement expenditure goals. However, as explained in
section 2.3 retirement savings in voluntary private saving accounts are rather low in the Netherlands.
Even if households would halve their private retirement savings, this would be inconsequential
compared to the accumulated wealth in pension funds. Moreover, table 2 shows that although the
perceived profitability of savings may have reduced, private savings on average increased between
2008 and 2014, probably because of increased precautionary savings.15
4.2 Co-movements and the development of retirement savings adequacy
The last part of the paper analyzes to what extent co-movements between wealth and retirement
expenditure goals mitigated the negative effect of the Great Recession on retirement savings ad-
equacy. To this end, we compare the simulated preparedness based on a SUR model describing
changes in wealth and retirement expenditure goals with a counterfactual scenario in which goals
are kept constant at their 2008 level. In this way we isolate the impact of revisions in expenditure
goals on the development of the adequacy of retirement resources.
We estimate SUR models to analyze how wealth and retirement expenditure goals of different
socio-economic groups changed during the crisis. In these models we utilize data on all individuals
(also those whom we observe only in 2008 or 2014). Separate equations for annuities and expen-
ditures in 2008 and 2014 allow the relationships between goals and resources on the one hand and
individual and household characteristics on the other to be different in 2014 compared to 2008.
Hence, socio-economic groups are allowed to be affected differently by the recession (or, alterna-
tively, the composition of subgroups may have changed). Moreover, we allow the error terms of
the equations for expenditure goals and annuities to be correlated between individuals in a given
household and across the waves in which the household participates.
15Table 2a shows that the average annuity from private savings (excluding housing wealth) increased 83 euros ((2103-
1789)-(2401-2170)) and table 2b shows that for those individuals whom we observe twice private savings increased 57
euros (-298-(-355)).
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The model consists of six equations, three for 2008 and three for 2014:





















where M ti is the log of the retirement expenditure goal reported by the man in household i in wave
t ∈ {2008, 2014} and N ti is the log of the retirement expenditure goal reported by the woman in
household i and wave t. For singles, only one of the equations for minimal expenditures is relevant
for each year (depending on gender). W ti is log annuitized household wealth, and x is a vector
containing individual and household characteristics. We assume that the error terms follow a 6-
variate normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix Σ and estimate the SUR model
by maximum likelihood (see Roodman, 2011, for details on the CMP command that we used to
estimate the model in Stata). Differences between the estimated coefficients for 2008 and 2014
reveal how the crisis (and the subsequent reforms) affected retirement goals and wealth for different
socio-economic groups.
To assess the effect of co-movements between wealth and retirement expenditure goals on retire-
ment savings adequacy, we use the SUR estimates to simulate preparedness in 2008, in 2014 and
for the counterfactual scenario with annuities at their 2014 level and retirement expenditure goals
at their 2008 level. We simulate goals and annuities for all individuals in the sample, regardless
of whether they are actually observed in the data (to safeguard representativeness for the Dutch
population). Since the dependent variables are missing at random conditional on covariates, the
model estimates allow us to simulate preparedness in a way that is representative for the Dutch
population.16 Simulations are based on an expanded sample in which we replicate each observa-
tion 50 times (replicated observations have the same values of covariates but different error terms).
16The sub-sample for which we observe both wealth and retirement expenditure goals is not representative for the
population. That is caused by substantial non-response to the expenditure question and incomplete linkage with
administrative data for both years in our sample. De Bresser and Knoef (2015) show that non-response and failure to
match administrative records are correlated with observed characteristics that are related to goals and resources, such
as income. However, they also show that selection into the sample is exogenous once we condition on those observed
characteristics.
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From this expanded sample we calculate descriptive statistics of the distribution of the difference
between annuities and retirement expenditure goals. Confidence intervals are obtained by means of
parametric bootstrap consisting of 500 draws of parameter vectors from their estimated asymptotic
distribution. We control for perceived question difficulty by setting the difficulty of imagining how
much one would need to spend in retirement to the lowest value.
5 Results
5.1 Results on size and nature of co-movements
Table 3 presents estimation results for the model described in equations (1) and (2). Panel a.
contains the full sample estimates. The baseline estimates reported in column (1) show that a 1
euro drop in the pension annuity reduced retirement expenditure goals with 33 cents on average.
So, one third of the drop in pension wealth is compensated by lower retirement expenditure goals
(the remainder could be compensated by working longer, saving more or reducing bequests). The
coefficient on real estate is 0.06 and not statistically significant. The constant, which captures
aggregate common factors like pessimistic future income prospects, is large though insignificant.
To establish that results are not driven by outliers, we rerun the model after winsorizing changes
in both goals and annuities. The results in column (2) show that the effect of the change in pension
annuities on expenditure goals becomes smaller, but remains economically and statistically signif-
icant at 0.23. Moreover, the size and especially the precision of the constant increases, providing
stronger evidence for the role of common factors. On average expenditure goals declined by 132
euro in 2014 relative to 2008, keeping pension and real estate annuities constant. The 2SLS esti-
mates in column (3) are virtually identical to the OLS results in column (1), which is confirmed
by failure to reject the null of the endogeneity test for the annuity from real estate. Finally, when
we express both annuities and goals in logs rather than levels, we find no evidence for an effect of
either annuity on the retirement expenditure goals (column (4)). However, we do find a significant
overall reduction in average goals of 15%.
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Table 3: Shocks to annuities and changes in expenditure goals
Dependent variable: ∆ retirement expenditure goal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
a. All ages
∆ Pension (β1) 0.332** 0.229** 0.332** 0.0672
(0.141) (0.0983) (0.134) (0.0988)
∆ Real estate (β2) 0.0591 0.152 0.0599 -0.0398
(0.108) (0.120) (0.117) (0.0327)
Constant (β0) -103.3 -132.3*** -103.1 -0.153***
(71.4) (44.9) (68.0) (0.0278)
Wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 116.1*** 21.4***
Endogeneity ∆ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 2.07e-04 5.77**
n (number HHs) 282 282 282 272
N (total obs.) 307 307 307 296
b. Age 25-49c
∆ Pension (β1) 0.0625 0.0161 0.0618 -0.0133
(0.114) (0.151) (0.115) (0.166)
∆ Real estate (β2) 0.229*** 0.371** 0.219** -0.0304
(0.0640) (0.181) (0.0875) (0.0343)
Constant (β0) -86.2 -81.7 -87.9 -0.100**
(63.9) (75.7) (66.2) (0.0437)
Wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, 117) – – 34.2*** 670.1***
Endogeneity ∆ real estate F(1, 117) – – 0.020 9.2***
n (number HHs) 118 118 118 118
N (total obs.) 129 129 129 129
c. Age 50+c
∆ Pension (β1) 0.419** 0.341*** 0.419** 0.0741
(0.182) (0.115) (0.182) (0.125)
∆ Real estate (β2) -0.0455 0.0257 -0.0286 -0.111
(0.144) (0.141) (0.156) (0.150)
Constant (β0) -142.5 -171.5*** -137.9 -0.205***
(105.4) (57.5) (104.6) (0.0592)
Wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 134.1*** 7.2***
Endogeneity ∆ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 0.047 1.30
n (number HHs) 168 168 168 158
N (total obs.) 178 178 178 167
d. Difference between ages 25-49 and 50+ (H0: equal coefficients; statistics follow χ
2 (1) distribution)
∆ Pension (β1) 2.75* 2.95* – –
∆ Real estate (β2) 3.03* 2.28 – –
Constant (β0) 0.21 0.91 – –
a ∆ Annuities and ∆ expenditures are winsorized at p5 and p95. Winsorizing at p1-p99, or p2.5-p97.5 leads
to similar results.
b This column regresses ∆ log (goals) on ∆ log (annuities).
c OLS models on age sub-samples are estimated jointly.
The models also control for the individual-level covariates listed in Appendix D (with the exception of
gender, age, education and degree of urbanisation, since those variables display little or no variation within
individuals). Annuities and expenditures are standardized to a one-person household. Standard errors
clustered at the household level, in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%.
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The differences between models in logs and levels may indicate that our results are mainly driven
by individuals that experienced substantial wealth shocks. Though the estimates do not depend on
those in the lower or upper five percent of the distributions of changes in annuities and goals, it
appears that only larger reductions in wealth lead to downward revisions in retirement expenditure
goals. This could be explained by bounded rationality, mental accounting or inattention underlying
the ‘magnitude hypothesis’.17 This hypothesis states that individuals do smooth large income
shocks, but that they will not bother to adjust optimally to small income changes.
Panels b. and c. of table 3 report estimates for subsamples based on age. All models in levels,
columns (1)-(3), tell a similar story: expenditure goals of people younger than 50 are affected by
changes in the annuity from real estate, while the goals of older individuals are influenced more
strongly by pension annuities. For the younger group the estimates based on winsorized data show
that a decrease of 1 euro in the expected monthly annuity from real estate reduced expenditure
goals significantly with 37 cents. A similar decline in the expected annuity from pensions reduced
goals insignificantly with 2 cents. For older individuals the pattern is reversed: the coefficient on
the real estate annuity is 0.03 (insignificant), while the coefficient on pensions is 0.34 (significant).18
The 2SLS model in column (3) does not indicate endogeneity for the annuity from real estate in
either sample. Panel d. shows that the differences between coefficients for the two samples are
marginally significant for non-winsorized data, but only the difference in the effect of pensions
remains significant once we winsorize. Furthermore, the effect of common factors, estimated on
winsorized data in panel a., seems to be driven primarily by older individuals for whom expenditure
goals declined by 172 euros on average (conditional on wealth shocks). Finally, column (4) shows
that these results are not robust to taking logs of annuities and goals (elasticities). The models in
logs do not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that either annuity affects expenditure goals in
either subsample. As described above, this may be explained by the magnitude hypothesis. We do
find significant overall declines for both samples: goals were reduced by 10% for the young and by
21% for the older age group.
17Evidence supporting the magnitude hypothesis can be found in Browning and Collado (2001), Hsieh (2003),
Coulibaly and Li (2006) and Scholnick (2013).
18Similar conclusions can be drawn from the quantile models in Appendix G. Following Christelis et al. (2015),
Appendix H shows that these results are largely confirmed in models that only control for household composition.
Hence, they are not driven by the potential endogeneity of some of our control variables.
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Table 4: Shocks to annuities and changes in expenditure goals – heterogeneity by income
Dependent variable: ∆ retirement expenditure goal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
a. Low net household income in 2008c
∆ pension -0.0192 -0.00951 -0.0200 0.00246
(0.0902) (0.134) (0.0894) (0.135)
∆ real estate 0.0330 0.152 0.112 0.0228
(0.115) (0.190) (0.230) (0.0292)
Constant -99.6* -100.1* -86.0 -0.1010***
(51.8) (52.6) (60.4) (0.0366)
wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 41.7*** 15.5***
Endogeneity ∆ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 0.18 0.24
n (number HHs) 137 137 137 134
N (total obs.) 149 149 149 146
b. High net household income in 2008c
∆ pension 0.484** 0.314** 0.487** 0.130
(0.200) (0.133) (0.199) (0.135)
∆ real estate 0.0273 0.0518 0.0498 0.134
(0.127) (0.140) (0.134) (0.0922)
Constant -109.7 -204.5** -102.0 -0.1360***
(13.9) (83.0) (137.7) (0.0506)
wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 86.2*** 110.8***
Endogeneity ∆ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 0.14 1.84
n (number HHs) 145 145 145 138
N (total obs.) 158 158 158 150
c. Difference between low and high income groups
(H0: equal coefficients; statistics follow χ
2 (1) distribution)
∆ pension 5.27** 2.95* – –
∆ real estate 0.00 0.18 – –
Constant 0.00 1.13 – –
a ∆ annuities and ∆ expenditures are winsorized at p5 and p95. Winsorizing at p1-p99, or
p2.5-p97.5 leads to similar results.
b This column regresses ∆ log (goals) on ∆ log (annuities).
c OLS models on income sub-samples are estimated jointly. Cutoff between low and high income
group is chosen to include about half of the respondents in each group. The models also control
for the individual-level covariates listed in Appendix D (with the exception of gender, age,
education and degree of urbanisation, since those variables display little or no variation within
individuals). Annuities and expenditures are standardized to a one-person household. Standard
errors clustered at the household level, in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%.
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The data point towards heterogeneous effects of shocks to different components of wealth. More-
over, sensitivities of goals to wealth components vary across age groups. This might reflect age
variation in mental accounts: the young may be more likely to see real estate as a means to finance
retirement, while older individuals may see their house as a bequest more often. There is some sug-
gestive evidence for this, since 51% of the older respondents indicate they are not willing to move
house in order to free resources in retirement, compared to 34% of the younger group. For those
who want to live in their current house as long as possible, a higher house price has no real wealth
effect. Alternatively, housing may be more salient to the young while pensions are more salient to
older people. Yet another interpretation is that different age groups interpret shocks differently,
with younger individuals more likely to see shocks to pension entitlements as transitory.
Table 4 shows that the results are mainly driven by households with a relatively high income
level. Thus, although the marginal propensity to consume out of shocks is found to be larger for
households with a low amount of resources (McCarthy, 1995, Dynan et al., 2004, and Johnson
et al., 2006), we find that low-income households adjust their long run consumption less after a
wealth shock. This could be due to low income households having fewer possibilities to adjust their
retirement expenditure goals downward, as they have relatively more essential spending. In the
long run low income households may prefer to retire later, rather than to lower their retirement
expenditure goals (this is in line with results on planned retirement dates studied by Lindeboom
and Montizaan, 2018).
Unfortunately, there is little overlap between the samples for 2008 and 2014 and this reduces our
sample size. Though the clean, individual-level measurement of wealth shocks from administrative
data and the innovative outcome variable are contributions to the literature, we should view the
results with caution.
5.2 Simulation results on retirement savings adequacy
To investigate the extent to which co-movements between wealth and retirement expenditure goals
tempered the negative effect of the crisis on retirement savings adequacy, we simulate retirement
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Figure 2: Simulated preparedness for retirement: fraction that cannot afford retire-
ment expenditure goals (spikes are 90% CIs)
the simulation results (a more detailed description can be found in Appendix J). We find that
between 2008 and 2014 the fraction of individuals who do not accumulate a sufficiently generous
pension entitlement to afford their self-reported retirement expenditure goal increased from 27%
to 32%. Furthermore, the median difference between pension annuities and retirement expenditure
goals decreased from 24% in 2008 to 20% in 2014. Hence, based on pensions alone the aggregate
preparedness for retirement of the Dutch population declined only slightly during the period of the
financial crisis and the subsequent recession. A similar picture of modest decline in preparedness
emerges if we include discretionary wealth and/or housing wealth: the fraction for whom the annuity
will fall short of their consumption goal increased by a similar amount and the median excess annuity
declined by less than 5%-points. In particular, while 11% of the population was predicted to fall
short of their retirement expenditure goal in 2008 even if they would draw down housing wealth,
this fraction had risen to 17% by 2014.
In order to separate changes in goals and resources we simulate the fraction that would have
failed to meet their expenditure goals had the relationship between goals and covariates remained
the same in 2014 as it was in 2008 (so that goals are fixed for a given level of covariates). In this
counterfactual scenario the fraction with insufficient resources to afford their retirement expenditure
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Table 5: Aggregate simulation results: differences between annuities and expenditure goals
Pensions
Pensions + wealth
Pensions + wealth + housing
2008 2014 2008 2014 2008 2014
Median goal (2014 euro) 1565 1371 1560 1375 1561 1376
(1494; 1648) (1310; 1437) (1492; 1645) (1313; 1442) (1491; 1645) (1315; 1444)
Median annuity (2014 euro) 1989 1656 2146 1846 2795 2314
(1964; 2013) (1644; 1670) (2119; 2179) (1829; 1866) (2758; 2838) (2290; 2338)
Median difference (%) 24 20 32 31 57 53
(19; 29) (15; 25) (27; 37) (26; 35) (52; 61) (48; 58)
90% confidence intervals in parentheses. CIs are obtained by parametric bootstrap over the asymptotic distribution of
the ML estimator (500 iterations). In each iteration we replicate the sample 50 times.
Simulations are corrected for over-representation of homeowners in the LISS panel. Understanding of items measuring
consumption goals is controlled for by setting it to the highest level.
goals would have almost doubled from 27% to 50% (if we only take pensions into account). Adjusting
goals reduced the fraction of insufficiently prepared by 18%-points. Based on all wealth components,
co-movements between wealth and retirement expenditure goals mitigated the fraction falling short
from about a quarter to 17%. So, the results show that co-movements between wealth and retirement
expenditure goals mitigated the decline in retirement savings adequacy considerably.
Results are very similar if we do not control for question difficulty. In that case expenditure
goals are slightly lower in both years so that the median difference and the fraction that falls short
respectively increase and decrease with 3%-points across the board. Hence, our simulations are
not driven by the adjustment of expenditure goals for question difficulty. Moreover, robustness
checks with different indexation scenarios for occupational pensions in 2014 indicate that annuities
are robust with regard to reasonable variation in the assumptions under which they are computed.
Robustness checks of the simulations are available on request.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates co-movements between wealth and retirement expenditure goals using vari-
ation brought about by the Great Recession. These co-movements have important implications
for retirement savings adequacy, and become increasingly important as the generosity of public
pensions declines and people depend more on financial markets and housing wealth. We quantify
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co-movements and separate ‘pure’ wealth effects from common factors that influence both wealth
and retirement expenditure goals. Furthermore, we examine how adjustments to expenditure goals
mitigated the negative effect of the Great Recession on retirement savings adequacy, defined by the
difference between individual retirement expenditure goals and annuitized wealth.
The setting of the Netherlands during the aftermath of the crisis is particularly interesting for
this study, because it constituted an exogenous shock to a system that enrolls individuals into
mandatory public and occupational pension schemes. Participants cannot choose their own pension
fund, their contribution level, and their investment strategy. Hence, variation across funds in shocks
to pension wealth, the most important source of income in retirement, is exogenous to workers.
Moreover, house prices decreased by 20% on average between 2008 and 2013, eating into the most
important category of discretionary wealth. This context of large and exogenous changes to wealth
provides a unique opportunity to study the updating of expenditure goals.
For this study we match individual level administrative data on pension wealth, real estate and
other forms of wealth with survey data on expenditure goals in retirement. Goals and resources are
observed in 2008 and 2014. The combination of administrative data and surveys before and during
the Great Recession is unique. However, since a limited number of individuals can be observed
twice, some caution is needed when drawing conclusions.
The results show that between January 2008 and December 2014 both ‘pure’ wealth effects
and common factors played a role in co-movements between wealth and retirement expenditure
goals. At the level of the individual, we find suggestive evidence for heterogeneous effects of shocks
to pensions and real estate wealth. Shocks to pensions exert the stronger effect overall, with a
reduction in goals of 23-33 cents on average for a 1 euro decrease in the pension annuity. Moreover,
the relative importance of shocks in wealth components varies with age: individuals younger than
50 adjusted goals more strongly after a shock to housing wealth, while the goals of older people
were most affected by shocks to pensions. One possible explanation is that mental accounts change
as people age. We do observe that the young are more likely to report a willingness to move and use
their home to finance retirement if necessary than older individuals. Interestingly, while in the short
run consumption of low income households is found to be more sensitive to wealth shocks (they
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have a relatively high marginal propensity to consume), we find that they adjust their retirement
expenditure goals less after a wealth shock. Since low income households have relatively high
essential spending, in the long run they may prefer to work more or retire later instead of adjusting
their retirement expenditure goals downward. The fact that all effects of annuities disappear in
log-log specifications suggests that only substantial changes to wealth induce updates of spending
targets. We believe that these results warrant further attention.
Comparison of the two cross-sectional waves shows that in case people would not have adjusted
their goals, the percentage falling short with respect to their own retirement expenditure goals
would have risen from 11% in 2008 to 26% in 2014 if we take all wealth components into account.
Instead, people adjusted their goals downwards and the fraction who was ill-prepared increased only
to 17% (based on all wealth components). The results underline the importance of co-movements
between wealth and retirement expenditure goals, and that a static benchmark for the assessment of
savings sufficiency not only misses cross-sectional differences in preferences, but also cannot capture
adjustments to a changing environment.
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The y-axis of figure A1 shows the relative decline in funding ratios of Dutch pension funds during
2008. The figure shows that there are vast differences across funds in the relative decline in funding
ratios. In the first quarter of 2008 only 7 funds had a funding ratio below 105%, 256 funds had a
funding ratio between 105% and 130% and 166 funds had a funding ratio above 130%. In the first
quarter of 2009 the number of funds with a funding ratio below 105% increased to 314, 65 funds
had a funding ratio between 105− 130%, and only 20 funds had a funding ratio above 130%.
Pension funds with a low funding ratio were forced to draw up recovery plans in early 2009 in
order to bring their funding ratios back to the required levels within five years. These plans ended
in late 2013. DNB (2014) reports that funding ratios recovered primarily as a results of rising equity
prices, but as interest rates fell further and life expectancy rose, the recovery remained relatively
limited. All in all, about 25% of the original decline in funding ratios since the credit crisis was
recovered at the end of 2013 (with vast differences between individual funds).
Figure A1: Relationship between regulatory solvency and relative decline in funding
ratios during 2008, source: DNB (2009)
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B Development consumer confidence
Figure B1 shows the development of a subquestion of consumer confidence, namely people’s con-
fidence in their financial situation in the next 12 months. The vertical axes shows the balance
between positive and negative answers, normalized to 0 in the first quarter of 2008 for low, middle
and high education levels. While the levels of confidence are higher for high education groups than
for low education groups, the development is almost the same in both groups.
Figure B1: Development of people’s confidence in their financial situation in the
next 12 months, by education level
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C Thinking about retirement and difficulty of the questions
Respondents find questions on expenditure goals during retirement challenging. This appendix
first compares the distribution of retirement expenditure goals between retirees and non-retirees.
Secondly, we provide descriptive statistics on the extent to which respondents have thought about
retirement and how they evaluated the difficulty of the questions.
Comparison retirees and non-retirees
Table C1: Descriptive statistics of minimum expenditures during retirement
Non-retired Retired
N Mean SD p25 Mdn p75 N Mean SD p25 Mdn p75
a. 2008
Min. monthly expendituresa 1142 1716 721 1218 1625 2031 254 1871 772 1335 1625 2226
Min. replacement rate (%)b 1142 74 28 56 73 88 254 83 26 67 81 98
b. 2014
Min. monthly expendituresa 1918 1471 567 1095 1460 1825 837 1549 576 1168 1460 1825
Min. replacement rate (%)b 1891 67 31 46 63 81 826 65 24 49 63 77
a Monthly retirement expenditure goals are standardized to a one-person household and denoted in 2014 euros.
b Replacement rate := monthly expenditure goal/current income
Table C1 shows that retirees reported higher expenditure goals than non-retirees across the
distribution, especially in 2008. The mean and the first and third quartiles were 100-200 euros
higher among retirees. Such differences cannot be explained by current incomes, as illustrated by
replacement rates that were also around 10pp higher among retirees. However, the differences in
levels are modest compared to the standard deviations in excess of 700 euros for both sub-samples.
Differences were smaller in 2014: less than 100 euros or 5pp in replacement rates. Hence, though we
do find that retirees had more ambitious goals than those not yet retired, the order of magnitude
was the same for both groups. Furthermore, the variation within groups far exceeds that between
groups.
Difficulty of the questions
Table C2 summarizes items that are related to perceived difficulty of the questions. These questions
allow us to investigate whether those who do not understand the questionnaire give systematically
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Table C2: Descriptives of self-reported question difficulty
2008 2014
Mean Age 25-39 Age 40-54 Age 55+ Mean Age 25-39 Age 40-54 Age 55+
I find it very difficult to imagine how much money I would want to have during retirement.
Fully disagree 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.11
Somewhat disagree 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.12
Somewhat agree 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.31 0.39 0.41
Fully agree 0.41 0.47 0.41 0.33 0.48 0.60 0.51 0.36
N 1610 502 728 380 3272 851 1257 1164
Table C3: Descriptives of retirement expenditure goals by level of question difficulty
2008 2014
I find it very difficult to imagine goals... N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD
a. Consumption goals: levels
...fully disagree 109 1913 1669 913 139 1633 1460 735
...somewhat disagree 133 1918 1787 797 212 1449 1430 518
...somewhat agree 530 1695 1625 677 806 1482 1460 572
...fully agree 399 1639 1625 674 804 1434 1400 532
...difficult to imagine: missing 266 1904 1669 856 865 1546 1460 577
b. Consumption goals: replacement rates (in %, relative to current household income)
...fully disagree 109 74 75 22 137 67 63 26
...somewhat disagree 133 80 77 37 208 64 58 30
...somewhat agree 530 74 71 28 790 67 63 31
...fully agree 399 71 71 27 789 69 66 31
...difficult to imagine: missing 266 83 82 26 852 65 63 24
different answers. When asked whether individuals find the question difficult to answer, in 2014
more individuals said they fully agree to the statement than in 2008. This holds especially for
individuals under 54.
Table C3 summarizes the retirement expenditure goals by level of question difficulty. Individuals
who find the question more difficult on average report lower retirement expenditure goals. However,
when retirement expenditure goals are measured relative to current household income this is no
longer the case, suggesting that question difficulty correlates with current household income.
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D Descriptives socio-economic variables
Table D1: Descriptives of socio-economic variables
a. Household level variables b. Individual level variables
2008 2014 2008 2014
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Single 0.20 0.40 0.38 0.48 Single 0.16 0.37 0.29 0.45
Female × single 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.41 Female 0.52 0.50 0.53 0.50
Age HH head 50 13 53 16 Age 49 13 53 15
Any kids 0.47 0.50 0.34 0.48 HH head 0.59 0.49 0.64 0.48
Number of kids 0.88 1.10 0.66 1.03 Any kids 0.48 0.50 0.37 0.48
Homeowner 0.76 0.43 0.69 0.46 Number of kids 0.92 1.11 0.72 1.06
Homeowner 0.77 0.42 0.73 0.45
Education
Primary 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21 Education
Intermediate secondary 0.18 0.39 0.16 0.36 Primary 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.25
Higher secondary 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 Intermediate secondary 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.42
Intermediate vocational 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44 Higher secondary 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28
Higher vocational 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.46 Intermediate vocational 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44
University 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.37 Higher vocational 0.23 0.42 0.26 0.44
University 0.08 0.28 0.12 0.32
Primary activity
1 salary worker 0.70 0.46 0.60 0.49 Primary activity
all salary workers 0.45 0.50 0.41 0.49 Salary worker 0.58 0.49 0.50 0.50
1 self-employed 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.31 Self-employed 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.25
all self-employed 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 Family business 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11
1 family business 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.13 ZZP 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23
all family business 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.07 HH work 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.27
1 zzp 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 Retired 0.15 0.36 0.24 0.43
all zzp 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 Disabled 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.20
1 retired 0.20 0.40 0.28 0.45 Other 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.27
all retired 0.10 0.30 0.19 0.40
1 disabled 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 Marital status
all disabled 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.15 Married 0.71 0.45 0.59 0.49
Separated/divorced 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.32
Marital status Widowed 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.24
Married 0.68 0.47 0.52 0.50 Never married 0.18 0.38 0.23 0.42
Separated/divorced 0.09 0.29 0.14 0.35
Widowed 0.04 0.19 0.07 0.25 Urbanisation
Never married 0.19 0.39 0.27 0.44 Extremely urban 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.36
Very urban 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44
Urbanisation Moderately urban 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42
Extremely urban 0.13 0.33 0.17 0.38 Slightly urban 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41
Very urban 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44 Not urban 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35
Moderately urban 0.22 0.42 0.22 0.42
Slightly urban 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 Net personal income 2025 7812 1796 4580
Not urban 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 Net household income 3528 6920 3052 4682
Net HH income 3529 7604 2987 5423
N 1894 4098 2308 5623
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E Descriptive statistics assets and debts
Table E1 presents descriptive statistics of various categories of assets and debt. The most important
types of assets in both years are saving accounts and owner-occupied real estate. On average
saving accounts made up 27% of total assets in 2008 with a median value of 19.5 thousand euros.
Residential real estate made up close to two thirds of the 2008 assets portfolio on average and the
median value was 246 thousand euros. By 2014 the median value of residential real estate declined
to 170 thousand euros and the average share in the assets portfolio declined to 58%. Consequently,
the relative importance of saving accounts increased to 36% of the portfolio, despite a decrease in
median savings to 14.2 thousand euros. Each of the other asset classes make up less than 5% of the
asset portfolio in both years. As for debt, mortgage debt is by far the most important among the
two types of debt that we observe: it accounts for 95% of total debt on average in both years. The
median mortgage debt declined from 88 to 80 thousand euros between 2008 and 2014.
Table E1: Descriptive statistics of assets and debts
2008 2014
% portfolioa Mean SD p25 Mdn p75 % portfolioa Mean SD p25 Mdn p75
Saving account 27 41.4 59.4 6.3 19.5 47.2 36 41.5 76.4 3.5 14.2 45.4
Risky assets 4 24.3 133.0 0.0 0.0 5.9 3 22.9 169.7 0.0 0.0 0.1
Residential real estate 65 247.2 222.8 104.7 246.0 335.6 58 168.5 149.0 0.0 170.2 242.7
Non-residential real estate 3 17.0 82.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 16.7 86.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Business 1 2.4 33.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 4.4 63.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other assets 0 2.0 20.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 4.4 80.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mortgage debt 95 116.5 126.3 0.0 88.3 195.6 95 111.3 128.7 0.0 80.0 187.9
Other debt 5 5.2 28.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 5 7.2 61.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
N 890 3,429
a Mean share of category in HH portfolio conditional on having non-negative total asset/debt.
Assets and debt in thousands of 2014 euros.
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F Assumptions underlying the annuities
An annuity value is an estimated monthly income from pensions, savings, and housing at the date
of retirement. In order to construct such annuities we need to make assumptions about the future.
The future looked different in 2008 and 2014, so that in some cases the assumptions differ between
those years. The scenario for the future from the perspective of 2014 was set up in correspondence
with specialists at the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Ministry of the Interior
and Kingdom Relations, the Ministry of Finance and the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis (CPB). In this section we explain the assumptions underlying the annuity values. Moreover,
we describe how we updated the private pension data to include policy changes introduced in 2013.
Life course
The level of a public pension depends on the number of years someone lived in the Netherlands
between the ages of 25 and 67, and on one’s marital status during retirement. We observe the
number of years individuals lived outside the Netherlands up to 2012 and assume that they will
not leave the Netherlands from this moment onwards. Moreover, we assume that marital status
stays the same. That is, we take into account marital status in our models, but we do not model
future divorces, marriages, or widowhood. Lastly, we assume that individuals stay in the same job
until they reach the statutory retirement age. That is, individuals who are unemployed remain
unemployed and individuals who are employed will not become unemployed, will have constant
wages, and will not retire early.
Statutory retirement age and private pension target age
In 2008 the age at which one could claim public pensions was 65, which was also the target age for
defined benefit calculations in private pension plans. At that point there was no indication that
this would change in the future (Goudswaard, 2011). We thus assume a retirement age of 65 when
calculating the 2008 annuities.
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The situation was completely different in 2014. In 2012 a law had been passed ensuring an
increase in the statutory retirement age19 and in 2014 an amendment was proposed that accelerated
the process. When calculating 2014 annuities we assume the situation as in the amendment: a
stepwise increase of the statutory retirement age to 67 in 2021, after which it will raise in accordance
with life expectancy. The target age for the defined benefit calculations in private pension plans
was set at 67 for the part of the claim built up after 2012. The increase of the target age went hand
in hand with a lowering of the maximum of tax advanced yearly accrual rates. We assume that
in the future any further increases in the target age will be accompanied with lower accrual rates,
such that the pension level remains roughly unchanged.
Inflation and indexation
We assume an inflation of 2% each year. Both for the 2008 and the 2014 annuities, we assume the
level of public pension benefits to be fully adjusted for inflation.
In 2008, 90% of occupational pension wealth was adjusted for inflation. During that time the
financial position of private pension funds seemed perfectly in order, and in January 2008 people
were optimistic about their future pensions. For the calculation of 2008 annuities we assume the
situation remains unchanged and all pension entitlements are adjusted for inflation by 90%.
In the past years, however, occupational pension wealth has rarely been adjusted for inflation,
so the value of pension wealth has declined in real terms. For the 2014 annuities we assume that
pension funds will not adjust pension entitlements for inflation until 2020, after which indexation
will rise gradually to 90% in 2030 and the years after. The 2008 and 2014 expected indexation
patterns and the realizations for the years 2008-2014 are shown in Figure F1.
Development of private savings and housing wealth
We take into account the current level of private savings and assume a real yearly interest rate of
1% per year. Private savings are annuitized at the moment of retirement given the most recent
19Wet verhoging AOW- en pensioenrichtleeftijd
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Figure F1: Indexation scenario’s and realisations, after Knoef et al. (2016b)
mortality tables of the CBS and a real interest rate of 1%. The annuitization procedure is explained
in detail in Knoef et al. (2016a).
We assume that real housing prices increase with 1% a year. For individuals with positive
net housing wealth we assume that the net imputed rent (1%) is put in a savings account where
it receives an annual interest of 1%. For individuals who have a mortgage we assume mortgage
payments are made. As of 2013 only individuals holding a mortgage contract with a pay off scheme
of at most thirty years can benefit from fiscal benefits. We therefore assume individuals born before
1968 will pay off 25% of the remaining mortgage debt, individuals born between 1968 and 1978
will pay 50%, and individuals born after 1878 will pay 75%. Housing wealth is annuitized at the
moment of retirement, given the most recent mortality tables of the CBS and a real interest rate of
1%, similar to private savings.
The third-pillar pensions (voluntary individual pension products) are not shown in the admin-
istrative data, since they are not subject to taxation until they are paid out. However, the LISS
survey does provide information on wealth accumulated in these products. For individuals who are
self-employed and have a third-pillar pension product according to the survey, we assume that they
will contribute 1.875% of their gross wage until retirement, in line with the contributions of salary
workers to their occupational pension plans.
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Updating 2012 occupational pension data
The latest administrative data available on occupational pension entitlements dates from 2012.
Between 2012 and the end of 2014 several policy changes have taken place that will affect pension
entitlements. Furthermore, most pension funds have not been able to correct the DB entitlements
for inflation, and some even cut entitlements.
The entitlement data consist of two elements: (1) the accrued rights; (2) the rights to be accrued
assuming income remains unchanged. First, we correct the accrued rights for the absence of inflation
adjustment between 2012 and 2014. Second, we decrease the accrued rights by an amount equal to
the cuts made in the respondent’s pension fund.20 The administrative data contain information on
the amount of pension rights, but not on the name of the pension fund. Therefore, we provided the
survey respondents in 2014 a list with the biggest pension funds in the Netherlands and asked them
indicate at which of those they had entitlements. Third, maximum pension contributions declined
from 2.25% to 2.15% in 2014, and further to 1.875% in 2015. The total relative decline is 17%.
We assume that the actual build up percentages decrease to the same extent for all pension funds,
hence we decrease the rights to be accrued until retirement by 17% for all individuals. Finally, the
target age used to calculate the DB income changed from 65 to 67 in 2013. Accrued pension rights
are therefore adjusted to the new statutory retirement age, at a rate of 7.5% per year. Pension
rights that are to be accumulated in the years until retirement are extrapolated to the new statutory
retirement age.
20Five major pension funds needed to apply cuts to accrued rights, that is ABP (0.5% in 2013), PME (5.1% in
2013), PMT (6.3% in 2013), Tandarts(specialisten) (3.2% in 2012 and 2.2% in 2013), Tandtechniek (7.0% in 2013,
2.0% in 2014).
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G Quantile models of changes in expenditure goals
Table G1a: Quantiles of shocks to annuities and changes in expenditure goals – heterogeneity by age
Dependent variable: ∆ retirement expenditure goal (2014 Euros)
p30 p40 p50 p60 p70
a. Complete sample
∆ pension 0.162 0.206** 0.287** 0.263** 0.254**
(-0.0421; 0.467) (0.0258; 0.475) (0.0533; 0.465) (0.0683; 0.491) (0.0951; 0.536)
∆ real estate 0.126 0.0520 0.00837 0.0594 0.104
(-0.154; 0.357) (-0.114; 0.306) (-0.115; 0.294) (-0.0946; 0.267) (-0.210; 0.231)
Sample quantiles -469 -324 -206 -125 18
N (total obs.) 307
b. Age 25-49
∆ pension -0.0160 0.123 0.194 0.322 0.168
(-0.303; 0.597) (-0.180; 0.599) (-0.117; 0.588) (-0.0585; 0.581) (-0.0576; 0.574)
∆ real estate 0.235 0.199 0.150 0.146** 0.170**
(-0.250; 0.487) (-0.102; 0.501) (-0.0897; 0.471) (0.00766; 0.491) (0.0163; 0.594)
Sample quantiles -430 -311 -206 -82 120
N (total obs.) 129
c. Age 50+
∆ pension 0.284 0.272** 0.262** 0.272** 0.298**
(-0.0110; 0.601) (0.0426; 0.544) (0.0310; 0.528) (0.0493; 0.547) (0.0556; 0.685)
∆ real estate 0.154 0.0313 -0.0103 0.000703 -0.185
(-0.212; 0.400) (-0.253; 0.360) (-0.267; 0.324) (-0.343; 0.282) (-0.431; 0.199)
Sample quantiles -494 -326 -204 -139 -18
N (total obs.) 178
The models also control for the individual-level covariates listed in Appendix D (with the exception of gender,
age, education and degree of urbanisation, since those variables display little or no variation within individu-
als). Annuities and expenditures are standardized to a one-person household. Bootstrapped 95% confidence
intervals in parentheses; ** significant at 5%.
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Table G1b: Quantiles of shocks to annuities and changes in expenditure goals – heterogeneity by
income
Dependent variable: ∆ retirement expenditure goal (2014 Euros)
p30 p40 p50 p60 p70
a. Low net household income in 2008
∆ pension 0.0742 0.121 0.0794 0.0737 0.123
(-0.258; 0.335) (-0.212; 0.333) (-0.169; 0.370) (-0.152; 0.392) (-0.205; 0.395)
∆ real estate 0.0288 -0.0239 0.0408 -0.0142 0.0738
(-0.473; 0.537) (-0.442; 0.472) (-0.368; 0.416) (-0.456; 0.335) (-0.407; 0.400)
Sample quantiles -351 -261 -165 -81 83
N (total obs.) 149
b. High net household income in 2008
∆ pension 0.341 0.234 0.334 0.381** 0.471**
(-0.0708; 0.627) (-0.0799; 0.686) (-0.00577; 0.680) (0.0312; 0.662) (0.0373; 0.763)
∆ real estate 0.119 0.0877 0.0782 0.158 0.188
(-0.320; 0.358) (-0.275; 0.325) (-0.272; 0.294) (-0.280; 0.296) (-0.251; 0.271)
Sample quantiles -603 -393 -209 -165 -18
N (total obs.) 158
The models also control for the individual-level covariates listed in Appendix D (with the exception of gender,
age, education and degree of urbanisation, since those variables display little or no variation within individu-
als). Annuities and expenditures are standardized to a one-person household. Bootstrapped 95% confidence
intervals in parentheses; ** significant at 5%.
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H Models of changes in expenditure goals that only control for
family composition
Table H1a: Shocks to annuities and changes in expenditure goals
Dependent variable: ∆ retirement expenditure goal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
a. All ages
∆ Pension (β1) 0.329** 0.235** 0.329*** 0.101
(0.129) (0.0930) (0.128) (0.0969)
∆ Real estate (β2) 0.0618 0.139 0.0836 0.00449
(0.105) (0.114) (0.111) (0.0149)
Constant (β0) -87.4 -111.2*** -83.1 -0.127***
(63.9) (41.4) (62.1) (0.0272)
Wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 104.9*** 20.0***
Endogeneity ∆ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 0.17 1.72
n (number HHs) 282 282 282 272
N (total obs.) 307 307 307 296
b. Age 25-49c
∆ Pension (β1) 0.144 0.140 0.141 0.102
(0.123) (0.142) (0.124) (0.166)
∆ Real estate (β2) 0.154* 0.182 0.113 -0.00580
(0.0832) (0.191) (0.104) (0.0138)
Constant (β0) -110.6* -104.7 -115.8* -0.106**
(66.0) (68.0) (66.0) (0.0441)
Wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, 117) – – 34.2*** 1174.2***
Endogeneity ∆ real estate F(1, 117) – – 0.35 3.02*
n (number HHs) 118 118 118 118
N (total obs.) 129 129 129 129
c. Age 50+c
∆ Pension (β1) 0.400** 0.304** 0.398** 0.102
(0.170) (0.119) (0.170) (0.114)
∆ Real estate (β2) -0.00845 0.0857 0.0581 0.0529
(0.155) (0.139) (0.157) (0.106)
Constant (β0) -115.8 -134.3*** -99.0 -0.138***
(91.1) (51.9) (89.9) (0.0427)
Wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 94.2*** 5.49**
Endogeneity ∆ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 0.81 0.00
n (number HHs) 168 168 168 158
N (total obs.) 178 178 178 167
d. Difference between ages 25-49 and 50+ (H0: equal coefficients; statistics follow χ
2 (1) distribution)
∆ Pension (β1) 1.49 0.78 – –
∆ Real estate (β2) 0.85 0.17 – –
Constant (β0) 0.00 0.12 – –
a ∆ Annuities and ∆ expenditures are winsorized at p5 and p95. Winsorizing at p1-p99, or p2.5-p97.5 leads
to similar results.
b This column regresses ∆ log (goals) on ∆ log (annuities).
c OLS models on age sub-samples are estimated jointly.
The models also control for living with a partner and the number of children in the household. Annuities
and expenditures are standardized to a one-person household. Standard errors clustered at the household
level, in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table H1b: Shocks to annuities and changes in expenditure goals– heterogeneity by income
Dependent variable: ∆ retirement expenditure goal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
a. Low net household income in 2008c
∆ pension 0.0496 0.0674 0.0509 0.123
(0.0840) (0.125) (0.0837) (0.129)
∆ real estate 0.0153 0.0779 -0.0109 -0.00161
(0.0980) (0.186) (0.169) (0.0172)
Constant -125.2*** -121.2*** -128.3*** -0.108***
(43.8) (45.7) (44.9) (0.0344)
wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 39.9*** 21.8***
Endogeneity ∆ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 0.059 1.86
n (number HHs) 137 137 137 134
N (total obs.) 149 149 149 146
b. High net household income in 2008c
∆ pension 0.434** 0.297** 0.435** 0.107
(0.184) (0.137) (0.184) (0.133)
∆ real estate 0.0729 0.118 0.0904 0.124
(0.133) (0.145) (0.139) (0.0949)
Constant -61.9 -120.1 -56.9 -0.104**
(119.6) (79.6) (120.5) (0.0498)
wealth expressed as annuity winsorized annuitya annuity log(annuity)b
First stage F(1, n-1) – – 90.9*** 120.4***
Endogeneity ∆ real estate F(1, n-1) – – 0.080 0.91
n (number HHs) 145 145 145 138
N (total obs.) 158 158 158 150
c. Difference between low and high income groups
(H0: equal coefficients; statistics follow χ
2 (1) distribution)
∆ pension 3.61* 1.53 – –
∆ real estate 0.12 0.03 – –
Constant 0.25 0.00 – –
a ∆ annuities and ∆ expenditures are winsorized at p5 and p95. Winsorizing at p1-p99, or p2.5-p97.5
leads to similar results.
b This column regresses ∆ log (goals) on ∆ log (annuities).
c OLS models on income sub-samples are estimated jointly. Cutoff between low and high income
group is chosen to include about half of the respondents in each group. The models also control
for living with a partner and the number of children in the household. Annuities and expenditures
are standardized to a one-person household. Standard errors clustered at the household level, in
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
46
I Estimation results SUR model
Retirement expenditures equations
Table I1 presents estimation results of the expenditure equations (3) and (4). The coefficients
for 2008 show that homeowners, highly educated men and women, self-employed men, and seper-
ated/divorced men had relatively high retirement expenditure goals. Widowers reported 19% lower
retirement expenditure goals while widows required 17% higher expenditures relative to married
couples. Furthermore, household income plays a significant role in explaining retirement expendi-
ture goals, with an elasticity of 0.48 for both men and women.21
We observe interesting changes between the coefficients of 2008 and 2014. Homeowners reported
6-9% higher retirement expenditure goals than renters in 2008, but that difference disappeared by
2014 (in line with the decline in house prices). The income elasticity of the retirement expenditure
goals dropped from 0.48 to 0.35, and highly educated women reduced their retirement expenditure
goals. Finally, self-employed men, who had relatively high retirement expenditure goals in 2008,
did not have these relatively high goals anymore in 2014.
Annuity equations
Table I2 presents estimation results of the annuity equation (5), both for annuities from public and
occupational pensions and for annuities from total wealth (including real estate). The estimates for
2008 show that annuities from pensions were relatively high for homeowners, for households with
highly educated heads, and for households that contain at least one salary worker. On the other
hand, those annuities were relatively low on average for single females, for households with a family
business, and for households with self-employed or a disabled household member. Furthermore, we
estimate the elasticity of annuities with respect to net household income at 0.3. Taking into account
21The estimates for the retirement expenditure goals for 2008 are mostly similar to those documented by De Bresser
and Knoef (2015). The largest difference is a stronger relationship between retirement goals reported by men and
household income: our estimates imply that a 10% increase in the income of the husband increases his expected
annuity by 4.8%, compared with 3.3% according to De Bresser and Knoef (2015). Moreover, this correlation is similar
for the income of his wife, so that household income is an important covariate of expenditure goals of both men
and women regardless of who brings it in. Though the differences in average reported retirement expenditure goals
between education groups are smaller than in the earlier paper, they remain large and highly statistically significant
with university graduates reporting 27-28% higher goals than those with no education beyond primary school.
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Table I1: Joint models of annuities and retirement expenditures – expenditure equations.
Retirement expenditure goals men Retirement expenditure goals women
2008 2014 − 2008 2008 2014 − 2008
Partner -0.023 (0.0425) -0.117** (0.0509) -0.041 (0.0528) -0.131** (0.0653)
Age/10 -0.011 (0.0143) 0.016 (0.0177) 0.050*** (0.0152) -0.032* (0.0180)
HH head 0.008 (0.0470) 0.037 (0.0599) -0.009 (0.0447) -0.020 (0.0550)
Any Children -0.063 (0.0518) -0.019 (0.0665) -0.052 (0.0479) 0.072 (0.0620)
Number Children 0.009 (0.0233) 0.018 (0.0301) -0.001 (0.0219) -0.003 (0.0291)
Homeowner 0.059* (0.0309) -0.055 (0.0376) 0.091*** (0.0303) -0.096*** (0.0369)
log pers. Income 0.010 (0.0167) -0.039* (0.0216) -0.003 (0.0067) 0.000 (0.0082)
Log HH income 0.482*** (0.0372) -0.130*** (0.0454) 0.478*** (0.0374) -0.131*** (0.0444)
Has simPC -0.013 (0.0637) -0.065 (0.0757) -0.056 (0.0615) 0.017 (0.0703)
Educationa
Inter. secondary 0.026 (0.0469) 0.012 (0.0618) 0.045 (0.0464) -0.071 (0.0582)
Higher secondary 0.140** (0.0600) -0.039 (0.0752) 0.173*** (0.0585) -0.150** (0.0704)
Inter. vocational 0.113** (0.0463) -0.053 (0.0612) 0.160*** (0.0505) -0.153** (0.0626)
Higher vocational 0.132*** (0.0464) -0.005 (0.0612) 0.181*** (0.0503) -0.132** (0.0622)
University 0.277*** (0.0539) -0.094 (0.0696) 0.275*** (0.0654) -0.162** (0.0790)
Labor market statusa
Family business -0.079 (0.1006) -0.024 (0.1361) 0.106 (0.0964) -0.051 (0.1305)
Self-employed 0.147*** (0.0448) -0.131** (0.0570) -0.036 (0.0542) 0.007 (0.0687)
Home maker 0.153 (0.1535) 0.135 (0.2097) -0.026 (0.0418) 0.004 (0.0530)
Retired 0.145 (0.1493) -0.112 (0.2256) -0.009 (0.1861) 0.101 (0.2477)
Disabled 0.046 (0.0728) -0.027 (0.0901) 0.028 (0.0727) -0.023 (0.0828)
Other primary act. 0.063 (0.0742) -0.069 (0.0856) -0.029 (0.0607) 0.041 (0.0693)
Marital statusa
Seperated/divorced 0.105** (0.0519) -0.087 (0.0617) 0.057 (0.0498) -0.072 (0.0613)
Widow -0.186** (0.0939) 0.153 (0.1034) 0.167** (0.0786) -0.240*** (0.0889)
Never married -0.001 (0.0391) 0.010 (0.0489) 0.079* (0.0418) -0.097* (0.0510)
How much have you thought about retirement?a
Thought some -0.052 (0.0513) 0.057 (0.0736) 0.051 (0.0623) -0.065 (0.0788)
Thought a little -0.031 (0.0516) 0.008 (0.0734) 0.034 (0.0598) -0.074 (0.0753)
Hardly thought -0.031 (0.0622) 0.019 (0.0839) 0.037 (0.0657) -0.029 (0.0818)
No answer -0.233 (0.2089) 0.011 (0.2946) 0.128 (0.2887) -0.201 (0.3481)
Urbanizationa
Extremely urban 0.082* (0.0423) -0.028 (0.0510) -0.066 (0.0443) 0.111** (0.0518)
Very urban 0.068** (0.0323) -0.047 (0.0392) 0.018 (0.0339) 0.036 (0.0404)
Slightly urban 0.054* (0.0324) -0.038 (0.0393) 0.014 (0.0351) 0.018 (0.0421)
Not urban 0.018 (0.0382) -0.042 (0.0464) -0.041 (0.0400) 0.009 (0.0475)
I find it difficult to imagine how much I need to spend in retirementa
Somewhat disagree 0.069 (0.5469) -0.165** (0.0753) -0.044 (0.0614) 0.016 (0.0779)
Somewhat agree 0.003 (0.0473) -0.110* (0.0666) -0.071 (0.0493) 0.082 (0.0633)
Totally agree -0.065 (0.0501) -0.025 (0.0697) -0.083* (0.0505) 0.050 (0.0643)
No answer 0.235 (0.1449) -0.263 (0.1909) -0.152 (0.2163) 0.171 (0.2392)
Constant 3.426*** (0.2980) 1.260*** (0.3630) 3.321*** (0.3140) 1.245*** (0.3713)
Sigma epslion 0.309*** (0.0081) 0.312*** (0.0086)
Log likelihood -1310.220
N 4,521
a The reference categories are primary education; salary worker ; married ; thought a lot about retirement ; moderately urban;
and totally disagree.
Dependent variables are logs of monthly retirement expenditure goals. Expenditures standardized to a one-person house-
hold; equations reported from models of annuity excluding housing wealth but including other savings. Standard errors in
parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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wealth outside pensions changes some patterns: single men, but not women, now do better than
couples and home-ownership plays a much more prominent role.22
Comparing the estimated coefficients for 2008 and 2014 in table I2 we find interesting differences.
Strikingly, the age gradient of pension annuities switched from negative to positive. While the
average annuity from pensions in 2008 decreased with 1.5 percent for a 10 year increase in age, in
2014 this was associated with a 2.0 percent increase in the average annuity. Moreover, the income
elasticity of pension annuities decreased from 0.3 to 0.2 (in table I1 we saw that this was mirrored
by a lower income elasticity of retirement expenditure goals) and the gaps between households with
and without wage workers and with and without self-employed adults narrowed somewhat (as self-
employed men also reduced their retirement expenditure goals, their relative position compared to
wage workers improved).
All these changes can be explained by the worsened situation of occupational pensions, which
are relatively more important for high income earners. As a result, pension cuts affect high earners
disproportionately and this flattens the association between income and annuities. The relative
positions of old and young individuals, and of wage workers and the self-employed are aligned by
the same mechanism (since occupational pensions typically play a minor role for the self-employed).
Though the changes we observe can plausibly be attributed to changing circumstances, a change in
the composition of socio-economic groups may also play a role.
We find broadly similar patterns when we take into account all private wealth. While in 2008 the
annuity based on all wealth increased by 1.8% on average for a 10 year increase in age, in 2014 the
corresponding figure was 4.1%. Similarly, the relationship between income and annuities flattened
and the gap between households with and without salary workers closed. Unsurprisingly, the role
of homeownership changed between 2008 and 2014 once we take into account housing wealth. The
22The estimates for 2008 are mostly similar to those reported in De Bresser and Knoef (2015). The only exceptions
are the estimated coefficients on household income and on the education dummies. Our estimates of the elasticity of
the annuities with respect to net household income are around 0.3, while De Bresser and Knoef (2015) report smaller
estimates around 0.1. This difference stems from the use of another survey variable for household income: the variable
we use has been augmented with imputations and responses to unfolding bracket questions, while the earlier paper
used a less streamlined income measure. This choice for a different income variable also reduces the differences in
annuities between university graduates and the lowest education group from 33-45% to 24-27%, which confirms the
interpretation that the large differences reported in that paper partly reflect measurement error in income (De Bresser
and Knoef, 2015). All other estimates for the annuity equations in 2008 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar
to those reported in the earlier paper.
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Table I2: Joint models of annuities and retirement expenditure goals – annuity equations.
Pensions Pensions + wealth + housing
2008 2014 − 2008 2008 2014 − 2008
Single -0.005 (0.0328) 0.044 (0.0353) 0.169*** (0.0378) -0.003 (0.0414)
Female × single -0.079** (0.0354) 0.038 (0.0372) -0.143*** (0.0404) 0.068 (0.0428)
Age HH head/10 -0.015* (0.0085) 0.035*** (0.0094) 0.018* (0.0098) 0.023** (0.0111)
Any kids -0.104*** (0.0270) 0.077** (0.0316) -0.069** (0.0309) 0.026 (0.0380)
Number children 0.026** (0.0115) -0.030** (0.0135) 0.024* (0.0132) 0.002 (0.0163)
Homeowner 0.089*** (0.0180) 0.025 (0.0195) 0.493*** (0.0208) -0.040* (0.0231)
log HH income 0.304*** (0.0215) -0.096*** (0.0238) 0.333*** (0.0250) -0.068** (0.0283)
Educationa
Inter. secondary 0.010 (0.0348) 0.038 (0.0394) 0.030 (0.0397) 0.015 (0.0465)
Higher secondary 0.031 (0.0399) 0.023 (0.0451) 0.087* (0.0458) -0.040 (0.0537)
Inter. vocational 0.075** (0.0347) 0.015 (0.0391) 0.074* (0.0396) 0.027 (0.0461)
Higher vocational 0.167*** (0.0349) 0.023 (0.0394) 0.204*** (0.0399) -0.015 (0.0464)
University 0.241*** (0.0399) -0.036 (0.0446) 0.271*** (0.0460) 0.021 (0.0527)
Labor market status
1 salary worker 0.119*** (0.0273) -0.051* (0.0308) 0.058* (0.0314) -0.046 (0.0367)
All salary workers 0.056*** (0.0197) 0.023 (0.0235) 0.014 (0.0226) 0.051* (0.0285)
1 family business -0.053 (0.0612) -0.047 (0.0707) 0.098 (0.0742) 0.098 (0.0890)
All family business -0.218** (0.0980) 0.106 (0.1109) -0.208* (0.1146) -0.019 (0.1374)
1 self employed -0.147*** (0.0295) 0.071** (0.0340) -0.154*** (0.0337) 0.186*** (0.0411)
All self employed -0.208*** (0.0555) 0.084 (0.0638) -0.090 (0.0646) 0.000 (0.0782)
1 retired 0.037 (0.0329) -0.036 (0.0373) 0.028 (0.0374) -0.031 (0.0442)
All retired 0.051 (0.0329) 0.009 (0.0360) 0.016 (0.0374) 0.049 (0.0419)
1 disabled -0.076** (0.0315) 0.030 (0.0369) -0.095** (0.0369) 0.043 (0.0455)
All disabled 0.137* (0.0793) -0.110 (0.0861) 0.091 (0.0901) -0.117 (0.1011)
Marital statusa
Separated/divorced -0.022 (0.0445) 0.009 (0.0481) -0.026 (0.0514) -0.055 (0.0570)
Female × sep/div -0.063 (0.0512) 0.016 (0.0559) -0.087 (0.0589) 0.102 (0.0664)
Widow -0.021 (0.0455) 0.033 (0.0476) -0.024 (0.0514) 0.129** (0.0545)
Never married -0.051** (0.0241) 0.048* (0.0264) -0.003 (0.0282) 0.016 (0.0317)
Urbanizationa
Extremely urban -0.005 (0.0244) 0.053** (0.0260) 0.057** (0.0281) -0.016 (0.0306)
Very urban 0.023 (0.0253) 0.035 (0.0269) 0.083*** (0.0290) 0.012 (0.0315)
Slightly urban 0.013 (0.0253) 0.050* (0.0270) 0.101*** (0.0291) -0.002 (0.0318)
Not urban -0.010 (0.0281) 0.062** (0.0301) 0.091*** (0.0323) 0.022 (0.0353)
Constant 5.123*** (0.1595) 0.273 (0.1776) 4.724*** (0.1852) 0.161 (0.2115)
Sigma epsilon 0.229*** (0.0056) 0.273*** (0.0066)
Log likelihood -1310.330 -2404.338
N 4,521 4,420
a The reference categories are primary education; married ; and moderately urban.
Dependent variables are logs of monthly annuities. Annuities standardized to a one-person household. Standard errors in
parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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importance of housing in the household portfolio decreased as a result of lower house prices: the
difference between the average annuity of homeowners compared to renters was 49% in 2008 and
45% in 2014.
Error correlations
Table I3 reports the estimated correlations between the error terms for all equations of the SUR
model. We find that the cross-sectional correlations between annuities and retirement expenditure
goals are positive and significant in both years (0.17-0.22). Hence, individuals in households that can
look forward to generous annuities conditional on their demographic characteristics, are also more
ambitious regarding their retirement expenditure goals. The cross-sectional correlations between
expenditure goals of partners within couples are even stronger, around 0.44-0.50, suggesting some
agreement between partners on the retirement expenditure goal they should meet.23
As for correlations between the years we find that conditional on background characteristics
annuities are relatively persistent, even in times of economic turbulence. The estimated correlations
between the errors of the annuity equations in 2008 and 2014 are 0.56 and 0.65 for annuities based
on pensions and on all wealth, respectively. Retirement expenditure goals are autocorrelated as
well, but less strongly with estimated correlations around 0.36.
23For the revision of retirement expenditure goals between 2008 and 2014 we also find some agreement between
partners, with a correlation of 0.5 conditional on observed charachteristics.
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Table I3: Error correlations
Annuity Min exp. Min exp. Annuity Min exp. Min exp.
2008 men 2008 women 2008 2014 men 2014 women 2014
a. Annuities from pensions
Annuity 2008 1
Min exp. men 2008 0.22*** 1
Min exp. women 2008 0.21*** 0.44*** 1
Annuity 2014 0.56*** 0.06 0.07 1
Min exp. men 2014 0.14*** 0.36*** 0.03 0.15*** 1
Min exp. women 2014 0.07 0.22*** 0.38*** 0.15*** 0.49*** 1
b. Annuities from pensions and all wealth
Annuity 2008 1
Min exp. men 2008 0.17*** 1
Min exp. women 2008 0.19*** 0.44*** 1
Annuity 2014 0.65*** 0.09 0.09 1
Min exp. men 2014 0.05 0.36*** 0.06 0.12*** 1
Min exp. women 2014 0.08 0.24*** 0.39*** 0.12*** 0.50*** 1
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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J Distribution of differences between goals and annuities
Figure J1 shows the simulated differences between retirement expenditure goals and annuities (both
in logs and at the level of the individual). The differences subtract expenditure goals from annuities,
so a positive difference means that the predicted annuity is sufficient to afford one’s retirement
expenditure goal and a negative difference implies insufficient funds. The graphs in the left column
correspond to 2008 and those on the right to 2014, while different rows vary the scope of wealth
from which annuities are computed. Comparing the columns, one notices that the locations of the
distributions did not change much between 2008 and 2014. However, the spread increased slightly:
the Great Recession increased inequality in retirement preparedness.
Figure J1: Simulated differences between annuities and expenditure goals
53
